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Legal positivism is the name typically given to a theory of law that holds that the norms that are
legally valid in any society are those that emanate from certain recognized sources (such as legislatures
or courts) without regard for their merits, i.e., without regard for whether the norms are fair or just or
efficient or sensible. Closely connected to this is the thought that, as the slogan has it, “there is no
necessary connection between law and morality,” which means, more precisely, that either (1) it is not
necessary for a norm to be legally valid that it satisfy a moral criterion (as Hart would have it), or (2) it is
necessary that morality not be a criterion of legal validity in a legal system (as Raz would have it). As Les
Green and John Gardner have emphasized in recent years1—and as Hart himself acknowledged with his
minimum content of natural law thesis nearly 50 years ago-- there are lots of senses in which law and
morality are necessarily connected, but the familiar slogan about “no necessary connection” has always
been meant to pick out either Hart’s or Raz’s theses about criteria of legal validity, one of which is
shared by everyone, I take it, who thinks that legal positivism gives us the best account of the nature of
law.
So why accept legal positivism as a theory of law? Sometimes legal philosophers make
extravagant claims on behalf of the theory. Julie Dickson, following Raz, says that,
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A successful theory of law…is a theory which consists of propositions about the law which (1) are
necessarily true, and (2) adequately explain the nature of law….I am using “the nature of law” to
refer to those essential properties which a given set of phenomena must exhibit in order to be law.2
If these are the criteria for a “successful” theory of law, then I fear there will almost certainly not be any
such theories. After all, we have no theories of any human artifacts that satisfy these conditions, not
even of science, one of the most developed human practices, about which some of the most thoughtful
philosophers of the twentieth-century—like Carl Hempel and Karl Popper—tried valiantly to identify
propositions that were “necessarily true” and which explained its “essential properties.” But these
accounts all failed, so clearly so that everyone--outside of the ineradicable fringe of every
professionalized Wissenschaft-- abandoned the project.3 Since the human practice of science is
disciplined by far more demanding criteria than the human practice of law—criteria like successful
“prediction and control” (the airplanes need to go up and come down where expected!)—should we
really expect “law” to fare better? The legion of skeptics are well-known,4 and even if some are just
amateurs, the apparent consensus about the “nature of law” within the core group of “professionals” is
too obviously a sociological artifact—namely, proximity to High Street in Oxford as a necessary condition
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for entry into the halls of serious legal philosophy--to constitute wholly adequate countervailing
evidence.
So let us deflate our ambitions in a way suitable to the subject matter and the history of
attempts to develop essentialist accounts of artifact concepts. Human artifacts answer to human
interests, thus their nature and character is hostage to changing needs and wants. Even so, we can try
to take a conceptual snapshot of these artifacts that answers to our current concerns. The snapshot will
no doubt have fuzzy borders, but nothing more can be expected. So deflated, it is easy to say why legal
positivism seems our best theory of law, without meaningful competition. Three theoretical desiderata
appear decisive.
First, if we honor Hart’s explicit theoretical aim of doing justice to what the ordinary man
understands about the modern municipal legal system,5 then we have no better theory than positivism:
it captures remarkably well the familiar distinctions between law and morality, law and policy, legal
knowledge and moral wisdom, and settled and unsettled law, the kinds of distinctions jurists, lawyers,
and educated laymen draw all the time. Although Raz’s “authority argument” for positivism has
generated a substantial secondary literature over the last twenty years, it is less often remembered that
Raz’s earliest arguments for positivism turned on its ability to explain precisely these kinds of
distinctions.6 Positivism, as he observed, “reflects and explicates our conception of the law,” for
example the fact that we distinguish between “the legal skills of the judge” and his or her “moral
character,”7 and between “deciding cases regarding which the law is unsettled” and those “where the
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law is settled” such that judges need only “us*e+ their legal skills in applying the law.”8 Anyone who
watched any of the recent confirmation hearings for Justice Sotomayor to the United States Supreme
Court can readily confirm that these distinctions are, indeed, central to the public conception of law in
the United States. But in legal systems where the judiciary is more disciplined by virtue of its civilservice character—this is true in Britain as well as most of the civil law countries—such distinctions are
also quite familiar. Positivism explains the distinctions: as Raz puts it, “the law on a question is settled
when legally binding sources provides its solution” and “since it is source-based, *the law’s+ application
involves technical, legal skills in reasoning from those sources and does not call for moral acumen.”9
Positivism, for similar reasons, also explains why there is massive agreement about what the law is in
the vast, vast majority of legal questions that arise in ordinary life.10
Second, it should surely count in favor of an account of the nature of law that it complements,
and perhaps even wins support from, work in the empirical sciences. In the history of philosophy, one
thing we have learned—I hope!—is that armchair confidence about reality often has to retreat in the
face of scientific success. So a theory of law that makes explicit the tacit or inchoate concept at play in
scientific research is probably to be preferred to its competitors. Positivism is that theory. If one
surveys, for example, the now vast empirical literature on adjudication,11 which aims to explore the
relative contributions of legal versus non-legal norms to decision-making by courts, that literature
always demarcates the distinction in positivist terms.12 That empirical researchers depend on the
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positivist theory of law to frame their research agendas is also further evidence that it discharges the
Hartian aim on the (plausible) assumption that social scientific researchers draw on their pre-theoretical
or common-sense grasp of concepts in framing their inquiries.
Third, it is always a theoretical desideratum to understand a phenomenon in ways that do not
involve controversial or incredible metaphysical commitments. So, for example, it would be a serious
problem for a theory of law that it made the nature of law dependent on the will of God, since we have
neither good reason to think God exists (and much reason to think he does not), nor reliable epistemic
access to his will (if he did exist). It is a virtue of legal positivism that its picture of the world is
metaphysically austere (though not as austere as some pictures!): it requires only persons and their
psychological states to explain the social phenomenon of law. 13 Moral truths and transcendental norms
play no role in the Hartian picture, though the former are required by the views of Finnis and Dworkin,
and the latter by Kelsen’s theory. Since the existence of either is controversial at best and incredible at
worst, it constitutes a theoretical virtue of legal positivism that it has no need for such an ontology.
Now admittedly the last two theoretical considerations in favor of positivism are driven by what
is often called naturalism. But naturalism, and this is key, is our world view, where “our” means we
post-Enlightenment folk. It is easy to lose sight of the “background” of intelligibility of our theoretical
endeavors, since we have no position outside that background from which to leverage or “ground” its
credibility. Yet even the most religiously devout respect the epistemic demands of naturalism in their
ordinary lives (e.g., sense perception is a reliable way to predict the future course of experience), and
since the scientific revolution, the rest of culture and thought has gradually been disciplined by
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naturalistic considerations in one guise or another. In favoring a theory that explains an artifact
naturalistically, we favor a theory that is most likely to find a place within our most general theoretical
accounts of how the world works.
So what theories stand opposed to the positivism that fares so well by the measures just noted?
“Natural law” theories are not really competitors to positivism any longer, I believe. Their most
sophisticated proponent, John Finnis, has already conceded that the legal positivist satisfies the first
desideratum (roughly,explaining what the common man means),14 and he has never been able to make
good on the more ambitious claim that no descriptive theory of law is possible.15 Finnitian Natural Law,
charitably understood, is just doing something different, trying to explain the features of morally ideal
legal systems. That is a good project, even if Finnis’s meta- and normative ethics are implausible. But it
states no dispute with positivism as a theory of law.
If not natural law theory, then what is the alternative to positivism? American Legal Realism, as
I have argued at length, is not only compatible with positivism as a theory of the nature of law, but
presupposes it in its explanation of the indeterminacy of legal reasoning.16 So that leaves us, as far as I
can see, with just one familiar contender: Dworkin’s theory of “law as integrity,”17 as he has come to
call it, according to which the law is whatever follows from the best “constructive interpretation” of the
institutional history of the legal system, that is, the set of principles that provide the best explanation
and justification for what the courts and legislature have done so far. But Dworkin’s theory fails along
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each dimension of theoretical adequacy just noted. For example, not only can it not explain why every
judicial reference to morality is not in fact legally binding, it even entails the bizarre and counterintuitive possibility that no one in the United States actually knows what the law is on any point, since it
may be that no one has figured out the best constructive interpretation yet. Dworkin’s theory figures
as the background to no empirical research program into adjudication, and it demands that there be
objectively right answers to all moral questions. It fails, in short, to explain what the ordinary man
understands about the modern municipal legal system, and it does so with a theoretical edifice that
plays no role in scientific research and which requires highly contentious metaphysical claims.
Those who take Dworkin’s theory seriously are usually not legal philosophers. Many
constitutional lawyers, both in the U.S. and in other countries, find Dworkin’s theory appealing because
they think it makes moral considerations relevant to the resolution of momentous constitutional
questions. Dworkin does think moral considerations are relevant to the resolution of such questions,
but so do Hart and Raz—indeed so does everyone else who is a positivist in the sense being discussed
here. Where the law is unsettled—as it often is in momentous constitutional cases--positivists of
course think moral considerations are pertinent to the best resolution of the question; and even where
the law is settled, positivists of course think that moral considerations can override the settled law: no
serious positivist theory holds that settled law imposes non-defeasible obligations on officials or citizens.
Only atrocious public relations for legal positivism--aided and abetted, of course, by decades of
scandalous misrepresentation by Dworkin--has led so many casual consumers of the jurisprudential
literature to think otherwise. This poses an interesting sociological question about jurisprudence, but
not an interesting philosophical one.
Positivism is our best-going theory of law, for the reasons already noted. It may be that law will
change in ways that make positivism obsolete; or it may be that our epistemic desiderata in theory

construction will change in ways that make positivism obsolete. But neither change has transpired yet,
which is why almost all legal philosophers are positivists. The only puzzle today is why everyone who
hasn’t thought carefully about the nature of law is not a legal positivist. I trust at least two of my copanelists will provide us some insight into this curious state of affairs.

